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Regulation allows microfinance institutions to evolve 
more fully into banks, particularly for institutions 
aiming to take deposits. But there are potential trade-
offs. Complying with regulation and supervision can 
be costly. The authors examine the implications for the 
institutions’ profitability and their outreach to small-
scale borrowers and women. The tests draw on a new 
database that combines high-quality financial data on 
245 of the world’s largest microfinance institutions with 
newly-constructed data on their prudential supervision. 
Ordinary least squares regressions show that supervision 
is negatively associated with profitability. Controlling for 
the non-random assignment of supervision via treatment 
effects and instrumental variables regressions, the analysis 
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finds that supervision is associated with substantially 
larger average loan sizes and less lending to women 
than in ordinary least squares regressions, although it 
is not significantly associated with profitability. The 
pattern is consistent with the notion that profit-oriented 
microfinance institutions absorb the cost of supervision 
by curtailing outreach to market segments that tend to 
be more costly per dollar lent. By contrast, microfinance 
institutions that rely on non-commercial sources of 
funding (for example, donations), and thus are less profit-
oriented, do not adjust loan sizes or lend less to women 
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I.  Introduction 
Microfinance institutions now reach well over 100 million clients and achieve impressive 
repayment rates on loans (Cull et al, 2009). The rapid growth of microfinance has 
brought increasing calls for regulation, but complying with prudential regulations and the 
associated supervision can be especially costly for microfinance institutions. The best 
empirical estimates of the costs of such regulation come not from microfinance or other 
financial institutions operating in developing countries, but from banks in industrialized 
countries. For example, by one estimate, the costs of complying with regulation in the 
United States are sizable, equal to 12 to 13 percent of banks’ non-interest expenses 
(Thornton, 1993; Elliehausen, 1998). We expect that such costs would be higher for 
MFIs, and Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg (CLR) (2003) speculate that compliance with 
prudential regulations could cost a microfinance institution (MFI) five percent of assets 
in the first year and 1 percent or more thereafter. 
In discussing tradeoffs in regulation of microfinance, CLR (2003, p.3) draw an 
important distinction between prudential and non-prudential regulation. According to 
their definition, regulation is prudential when “it is aimed specifically at protecting the 
financial system as a whole as well as protecting the safety of small deposits in individual 
institutions.”  The assets of microfinance institutions remain substantially less than those 
of formal providers of financial services, most notably banks, and thus they do not yet 
pose a risk to the stability of the overall financial system in most countries. However, an 
increasing share of microfinance institutions take deposits from the public, and many of 
the depositors are relatively poor. Protecting the safety of those deposits provides a 
rationale for improved regulation and supervision of microfinance institutions, and thus 
CLR argue that prudential regulations should generally be triggered when an MFI accepts 
retail deposits from the general public. 
There are multiple reasons why costs associated with this kind of regulation are 
likely to be higher for microfinance institutions. First, regulatory costs exhibit economies 
of scale and thus smaller banks face higher average costs than larger banks in complying 
with regulations (Murphy, 1980; Shroeder, 1985; Elliehausen and Kurtz, 1988).   3 
Moreover, the start-up costs of regulation display more pronounced scale economies than 
ongoing costs, because they have a large indivisible component which requires the same 
amount of time and expense regardless of the scale of bank lending activities. Again, 
these estimates of scale economies are for U.S. banks. For microfinance institutions in 
developing countries that have never faced regulation, the costs are likely to be even 
higher. Moreover, frequent reporting to a supervisory authority about its financial 
position is substantially more difficult for an MFI that specializes in very small 
transactions than for other financial intermediaries such as banks (CLR, 2003). 
A second reason why the costs of compliance with prudential regulation might be 
especially onerous for microfinance institutions stems from the high share of skilled labor 
costs involved. Studies indicate that most of the costs of complying with new banking 
regulations in industrialized countries are for labor (Shroeder, 1985; Elliehausen and 
Kurtz, 1985; Elliehausen and Lowery, 1997), and a substantial component of those labor 
costs are managerial and legal expenses – to monitor employee compliance, coordinate 
compliance reviews with regulators, and keep abreast of regulatory changes, regulator 
interpretations, and court decisions (Elliehausen, 1998). Such skilled labor is likely to be 
in short supply in many MFIs and costly to acquire. Even the less skilled administrative 
work associated with preparing regular reports for supervisors is likely to be done in 
headquarters, which could mean less staff in the field working directly with clients. 
Third, microlending inherently involves making small loans to large numbers of 
borrowers. Because the administrative costs per dollar lent are much higher for small 
loans than for large ones, the interest rates necessary to cover all costs (including costs of 
funds and loan losses) are much higher for MFI loans than for conventional bank loans. 
Fortunately, the returns to capital can also be high for small, capital-starved businesses, 
and so high interest rates can be paid (see for example, De Mel et. al., 2006 and 
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2007).  At the same time, any factor that causes costs to go up, 
including the costs associated with complying with prudential regulation, is likely to 
force MFIs to raise either interest rates or loan sizes to maintain the same level of 
profitability.  Increases on either dimension could result in the exclusion of some 
potential borrowers.    4 
We investigate the impact of prudential regulation on the profitability and 
financial self-sustainability of microfinance institutions, with an eye on the channels 
through which impacts work.  For example, if profit-oriented MFIs find ways to absorb 
the costs of prudential regulation that leave their profits unchanged, it would be of 
interest to see whether these costs are absorbed by changing the business orientation and 
curtailing outreach to smaller borrowers and women because reaching those market 
segments can be more costly per dollar lent. We also examine whether prudential 
regulation reduces the share of employees who work in the field. Finally, if prudential 
regulation imposes costs, we also need to investigate what those costs buy. In particular, 
we look at whether regulation is associated with improved loan quality. 
These issues have been under-studied largely due to lack of data. The latest round 
of the MixMarket dataset, which provides unusually high-quality financial information 
for 346 institutions in 67 countries, allows us to address these issues. The MFIs included 
in the MixMarket are among the largest in the world, and their willingness to submit their 
financial information to the Microfinance Information eXchange, Inc. (MIX) indicates a 
commitment to achieving financial self-sufficiency. We expect that these would be the 
MFIs best positioned to absorb the costs of prudential regulation. If we find evidence of 
trade-offs associated with such regulation in this group of MFIs, we expect that the 
effects would be even more pronounced for smaller institutions not included in our 
database. 
Most MFIs face some form of non-prudential regulation. These regulations can 
include rules governing MFI formation and operations, consumer protection, fraud 
prevention, establishing credit information services, secured transactions, interest rate 
limits, foreign ownership limitations, and tax and accounting issues (CLR, 2003). 
Prudential regulations are less common and are imposed when system-wide concerns are 
justified or protecting small depositors is an issue. 
Previous research on microfinance regulation and prudential supervision focuses 
on the relationship between financial performance and regulation, treating outreach as a 
secondary concern. Hartarska (2005) finds that regulated MFIs in Central and Eastern   5 
Europe and the Newly Independent States have lower return on assets relative to others, 
and weak evidence that the breadth of outreach may be related to regulation. After 
controlling for the endogeneity of regulation, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) find that 
regulation has no impact on financial performance and weak evidence that regulated 
MFIs serve less poor borrowers. Mersland and Strøm (2009) use an endogenous 
equations approach to find that regulation does not have a significant impact on financial 
or social performance, where regulation is measured by a regulation dummy variable. 
These previous efforts to study the effect of regulation are based on a binary 
regulation indicator variable. Based on information from the MIX database collected for 
the Microbanking Bulletin publication, which we cross-referenced with information from 
other sites, we construct a measure of whether an MFI faces prudential regulation of the 
sort described in CLR (2003). We construct two variables that are the focus of the 
analysis, a dummy variable equal to one if an MFI faces onsite supervision, and another 
equal to one if that supervision occurs at regular intervals. Within the same country, we 
find that some MFIs face onsite supervision while others do not, depending on their 
ownership structure, funding sources, activities, and organizational charter. To our 
knowledge, this is the first dataset that allows for within-country variation regarding MFI 
regulation and supervision.  
Our results suggest that microfinance institutions subjected to more rigorous and 
regular supervision are not less profitable compared to others despite the higher costs of 
supervision. We also observe that this type of supervision is associated with larger 
average loan sizes and less lending to women, hence indicating a reduced outreach to 
segments of the population that are more costly to serve. We also find that controlling for 
the non-random assignment of supervision is important in obtaining these results.   
Lacking time series data on MFIs’ performance before and after supervision, our 
empirical strategy is to start with a rough classification of the extent to which MFIs in our 
sample are profit-oriented based on their sources of funding. We hypothesize that greater 
reliance on commercial sources (like deposits) than on non-commercial sources (like 
donations) would lead an MFI to be more profit-oriented. While it is true that   6 
commercially funded (profit oriented) MFIs tend to be supervised more often than non-
commercially funded ones, there is still variation in supervision within each group. This 
is the variation we exploit in the paper: we compare the supervised with the unsupervised 
MFIs in each sub-group (commercially oriented and non-commercially oriented). We 
argue that this is a fair test because MFIs in the commercially funded group are facing 
similar incentives to make profits. Similarly, the MFIs that are not commercially funded 
face weaker incentives to be profitable, so comparing the supervised and unsupervised 
within that group is also a fair test. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we describe our data 
and present the relationships between MFI characteristics (e.g., size, lending 
methodology), MFI performance (profitability and outreach), and our regulatory 
variables. Those relationships help to form the profiles for regulated versus un-regulated 
MFIs. Because the profiles in section 2 indicate strongly that the assignment of regulation 
and supervision to MFIs is non-random, we discuss estimation techniques that can 
account for selection effects in section 3. We present regression results in section 4, 
robustness checks based on split-sample tests in section 5, and offer concluding remarks 
in section 6. 
II.  Data 
The analysis relies on data from 346 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 67 developing 
countries that were collected by the Microfinance Information eXchange (or the MIX), a 
not-for-profit private organization that aims to promote information exchange in the 
microfinance industry.
1
                                                 
1 This is a substantial increase over the MIX database used in Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007), 
which contained information from 124 MFIs in 49 countries. That data set was a variant of the so-called 
MBB 9 database. In this paper, we use a variant of the MBB 10 database. 
 There are 540 observations in our database because some MFIs 
report information for multiple years. In the regressions that follow, we use only the most 
recent observation from each MFI because the error terms from observations from the 
same MFI are likely to be correlated, leading to an artificial reduction in the standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients. Qualitative results are similar when we include all   7 
observations in the regressions and cluster standard errors at the MFI level.  All but one 
of the most recent observations are from 2003 or 2004.
2
The data are collected for publication in the Microbanking Bulletin (MBB) and 
have been adjusted to help ensure comparability across institutions when measuring 
profitability.
 
Participation by microfinance institutions in the MIX is voluntary, and thus the 
sample is skewed toward institutions that have stressed financial objectives and 
profitability. These institutions also tend to be large by the standard of MFIs, covering 
16.1 million active microfinance borrowers with a combined total of $2.8 billion in 
assets.  Most of the clients (10 million) are found in the top 20 largest institutions. 
Honohan (2004) finds that the largest 30 MFIs account for more than three-quarters of 
the customers of 2,572 MFIs that report to the Microcredit Summit.  While we cannot be 
certain, it seems highly likely that our sample covers a significant proportion of the 
customers in that database. The relatively large, profitable MFIs in our dataset are likely 
to be in the best position to absorb the costs of prudential supervision. If we find evidence 
that they decrease outreach to help absorb those costs, we would presume that the smaller 
MFIs not covered in our dataset would face even more severe tensions.  
3
The key variables in the analysis summarize whether an MFI faces prudential 
supervision. As already pointed out, most MFIs face some form of non-prudential 
regulation, and thus it is not surprising that the average for the regulatory dummy 
variable that is included in the MBB and our dataset is 0.85 (Table 1).
 In addition to standard entries from the balance sheet and income 
statements, the dataset contains qualitative information on the lending style employed by 
the MFI (group versus individual-based lending), the range of services it offers, its profit 
status, ownership structure, charter status, and sources of funds. Many of these serve as 
important controls in the regressions that follow. 
4
                                                 
2 We have one observation from 2002, 50 from 2003, and 194 from 2004. 
3 These include adjustments for inflation, the cost of subsidized funding, current-year cash donations to 
cover operating expenses, donated goods and services, write-offs, loan loss reserves and provisioning, a 
reclassification of some long-term liabilities as equity, and the reversal of any interest income accrued on 
non-performing loans.   
  It also comes as 
4 The institutions included in MicroBanking Bulletin data tends to be larger and more profitable than the 
broader set of MFIs included in Mixmarket data. This difference could account for why 85 percent of MFIs   8 
no surprise that, due to its uniformity, the simple regulation variable cannot explain 
substantial variation in MFI profitability or outreach. What is needed is a variable that 
better summarizes variation in the cost of complying with regulation. Towards that end, 
we offer three dummy variables indicating whether (1) an MFI faces a regular reporting 
requirement to a regulatory authority; (2) the MFI faces onsite supervision; and (3) onsite 
supervision occurs at regular intervals. Because MFIs that face onsite supervision also 
have a regular reporting requirement to supervisory authorities, the set of MFIs under 
supervision are a subset of those with reporting requirements. Similarly, MFIs that face 
regular onsite supervision are a subset of those that face any onsite supervision. Moving 
from the least to the most stringent type of supervision, 68% of our sample have a 
reporting requirement, 51% face onsite supervision, and 38% face onsite supervision at 
regularly scheduled intervals. 
Table 1: Regulatory Variables 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Dummy Variables  Observations  Mean 
Regulation 
(from MBB database) 
225  0.85 
Regular Reporting 
(Constructed here) 
220  0.68 
Onsite Supervision 
(Constructed here) 
245  0.51 
Regular Onsite Supervision 
(Constructed here) 















                                                                                                                                                 
are regulated in our data while only 67 percent are regulated in Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), for 
example.   9 
Panel B: Distribution by country and region, selected variables 










Albania  2  1  0.50    Kenya  2  1  0.50 
Armenia  5  0  0    Kyrgyz Republic  1  1  0 
Azerbaijan  3  0  0    Malawi  2  0  0 
Bangladesh  4  0  0    Mexico  4  0.75  0 
Bolivia  9  1  0.22    Mongolia  1  1  1 
Bosnia and Herz.  10  0  0    Nepal  1  1  0 
Brazil  5*  0.20  0    Nicaragua  10  0.10  0 
Bulgaria  2  0  0    Pakistan  14  0  0 
Ecuador  16  1  1    Peru  24  0.63  0.63 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  3  0  0    Philippines  24  0.38  0.38 
El Salvador  3  1  0    Russian Federation  15  0.73  0 
Ethiopia  15  1  1    Serbia and Montenegro  3  0  0 
Georgia  6  0  0    South Africa  1  1  0 
Ghana  18  0.67  0.67    Tajikistan  2  1  0 
India  7  1  1    Tanzania  5  0.20  0.20 
Indonesia  12  0.92  0.92    Thailand  1  0  0 
Jordan  4  0  0    Uganda  8  0.63  0.13 
Kazakhstan  2  0  0    Ukraine  1  0  0 
Region  Obs    Region  Obs 
East Asia & Pacific  38    Middle East & North Africa  7 
Europe & Central Asia  52    South Asia  26 
Latin America & Caribbean  71*    Sub-Saharan Africa  51 
* One less observation for Regular Onsite Supervision. 
To construct our regulatory variables, we use the legal (or charter) status of each 
MFI. That variable classifies institutions into one of five types: banks, rural banks, credit 
unions and cooperatives, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). We then looked at the description of the regulation faced by MFIs 
for each country as described on the MIX website. A quick perusal of those country 
pages indicates that the stringency of regulation faced by MFIs within a given country 
often depends on their legal status. In instances when we could not determine whether an 
institutional type faced a reporting requirement, onsite supervision, or regular onsite 
supervision from the MIX regulatory descriptions, we checked the websites of the 
regulatory authorities themselves. In the end we were able to obtain data for the onsite 
supervision variables for 245 MFIs; and 220 MFIs for the reporting requirement variable. 
Table 1 also provides statistics at the country level for the shares of MFIs facing onsite   10 
supervision and regular onsite supervision. The regional composition of the sample is 
provided at the bottom of the table. 
Table 2: Sample Comparison, Supervised Versus Unsupervised MFIs 
Variable  Faces Onsite 
Supervision 




 (t test  
significance 
at 95 CI)  
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Comparing the characteristics of supervised and unsupervised institutions 
indicates strongly that the assignment of prudential supervision is non-random. In Table 
2, we compare MFIs that face onsite supervision with those that do not because that 
regulatory variable splits our sample roughly in half. More detailed descriptions of the 
distributions and construction of the all of the variables used in the analysis are found in   11 
Appendix A. CLR (2003) argue that prudential supervision should be triggered when an 
MFI accepts retail deposits from the public and in our sample 74% of those that accept 
deposits face onsite supervision compared with only 14% for those that do not accept 
deposits. A much higher share of those with onsite supervision are non-NGOs that lend to 
individuals (rather than groups), make larger loans, lend less to women, and have a 
higher share of staff concentrated in the head office (and thus fewer staff with contact 
with clients in the field). Supervised MFIs also tend to be larger (in terms of assets), and 
a bit older and more profitable (in terms of Financial Self Sufficiency) than unsupervised 
MFIs. However, these differences are not significant for total assets or FSS. The profile 
that emerges is that more commercially-oriented MFIs tend to be supervised, while the 
more outreach-oriented MFIs are not. 
These summary statistics foreshadow our main regression results. Namely, while 
there is no significant difference in profitability, there is significantly less outreach 
(larger loan sizes and less lending to women) for supervised MFIs than unsupervised 
ones. These simple statistics are therefore also consistent with the idea that supervised 
MFIs are compelled to curtail outreach to maintain profitability. 
Operating expense ratios for supervised institutions tend to be lower than for the 
unsupervised. At first blush this might seem to contradict an important part of our story, 
namely that complying with regulation and supervision is costly for MFIs. However, 
operating expense ratios tend to be higher for institutions that make smaller loans and 
lend more to women precisely because those market segments are harder to reach 
(Gonzalez, 2007; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 2007, 2009). Table 2 therefore 
indicates that the costs of complying with onsite supervision are not large enough to push 
the cost profiles of the more commercially-oriented MFIs beyond those of the outreach-
oriented MFIs. Yet this does not necessarily indicate that the costs of complying with 
supervision are negligible or that commercially-oriented MFIs do not seek to defray those 
costs by making larger loans and lending less to women. In any event, the operating cost 
levels for the two groups are not significantly different from one another. 
   12 
III.  Estimation Technique 
Estimating the effects of regulation and supervision on MFI outreach and profitability 
calls for a technique that can account for the non-random assignment of supervision 
highlighted in the prior section. We opt for treatment effects regression which considers 
the effect on an endogenously chosen binary treatment (in this case, the choice to regulate 
and supervise an MFI) on another endogenous continuous variable (in this case, 
indicators of MFI profitability and outreach), conditional on two sets of independent 
variables. The first set of independent variables is used to estimate a selection equation 
that describes the supervisory choice. Information from the selection equation is then 
used in the financial development regression. The key difficulty is in finding an 
appropriate set of exogenous variables for use in the selection equation. As a check on 
our results, we also offer instrumental variables regressions. 
In many Heckman-type selection models, the dependent variable is observable 
only for those individuals (or households or MFIs) that received the treatment.  In this 
analysis, indicators of profitability and outreach are observable for MFIs that do and do 
not face supervision. Treatment effects models are therefore estimated in which: 
  Yi = α + βXi + δZi+ εi    (1) 
where Y is an indicator of profitability or outreach and X is a matrix of control variables 
describing an MFI’s size, lending technology, business orientation, and region. Z is the 
endogenous treatment variable indicating whether or not MFI i faces supervision.  As is 
typical in this literature, the decision to supervise is modeled as the outcome of an 
unobserved latent variable Z
*, which is a function of exogenous covariates W and a 
random component u: 
Zi* = γWi +  ui          (2) 
The researcher observes: 
  Zi = 1, if Zi*>0           (3)   13 
  Zi = 0, otherwise 
Because the selection of MFIs for supervision is non-random, and because the error term 
of the model that summarizes this choice (namely, 2) could be correlated with the error 
term in the regression of interest (namely, 1), one must search for a set of valid 
instruments. These instruments should be highly correlated with the endogenous 
regressor (the supervisory dummy), but contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error 
term in (1) (i.e., truly exogenous). 
We use three variables as instruments in the regressions that follow. The first is a 
dummy variable indicating whether large and medium-sized banks have annual (or more 
frequent) onsite supervision (“Big Bank Supervision”). The variable is based on survey 
responses from bank supervisors in more than one hundred countries that were collected 
by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006).
5 We view this variable as a measure of a country’s 
general propensity to regulate the banking industry.
6
As a robustness check on our main results, we replace the Big Bank Supervision 
dummy variable with an index of the official powers of bank supervisors, also developed 
by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). That index, which is described in detail in 
Appendix B, is based on sixteen questions about the powers granted to supervisors in 
monitoring and disciplining banks. Though the qualitative results of those models are 
similar to those that use Big Bank Supervision as an instrument, we have 40% fewer 
observations for the Official Supervisory Powers (“OS”) index, and thus significance 
 In countries with a high propensity 
to regulate banks, we expect that MFIs will also be more likely to face regulation and 
supervision.  The variable is exogenous in that the propensity to regulate banks existed 
before the MFIs arrived. Even had MFIs and large banks arrived contemporaneously, it is 
highly unlikely that the regulation of MFIs would have influenced regulation of banks, 
owing to the small size of the MFIs. 
                                                 
5 We use the 2003 version of that dataset because it corresponds most closely to the years covered in our 
data. 
6 One might worry that regulation and supervision is more stringent in better developed financial systems, 
and thus our supervisory dummies reflect financial development more than a propensity to regulate. 
However, when we control for measures of financial development in our treatment effects regressions, 
qualitative results are almost identical to those presented below.    14 
levels tend to be lower, model convergence is sometimes problematic, and excludability 
is harder to demonstrate.
7
Because the Big Bank Supervision dummy variable and the OS index do not 
explain sufficient variation in the assignment of supervision, neither can serve as the only 
instrument in our regressions.
 To conserve space, we do not present those results below. 
8
Our first MFI-level instrument is a dummy variable indicating whether each MFI 
is organized as a non-governmental organization (NGO) or a non-bank financial 
institution (NBFI). MFIs with NGO/NBFI charters tend to have objectives and funding 
arrangements that differ from those of more commercially-oriented MFIs (such as banks 
or credit unions). In particular, NGO/NBFI-based MFIs place greater emphasis on 
outreach and rely relatively heavily on donated funds to subsidize those efforts (Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009).  Because NGO-based MFIs were designed to be 
somewhat less commercially-oriented from their inception, we expect that there would be 
less need for supervision aimed at ensuring the quality of their asset portfolios.
 In part, this is because both are country-level variables 
and, as discussed above, there is substantial within-country variation in the types of MFIs 
that face supervision. We also therefore need instruments that provide MFI-specific 
information.  
9
In the regressions, we use a dummy variable indicating that an MFI was not 
organized as a NGO/NBFI (non-NGO/NBFI status) as an instrument. We recognize that 
our grouping is somewhat arbitrary in that we are lumping together banks, cooperatives, 
and credit unions and differences in their organizational structures might give rise to 
different incentives. However, we have relatively few cooperatives and credit unions in 
  
                                                 
7 Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) confront similar difficulties when using this variable as an instrument. 
8 The correlation between Big Bank Supervision and the regular onsite supervision variable is only 0.05 (p-
value 0.411). The correlation between the OS index and regular onsite supervision is 0.21 (p-value 0.004), 
but again that variable covers far fewer countries.. 
9 We recognize that some NBFIs are more commercially oriented than others. In robustness checks that we 
do not report, we split the NBFIs, grouping those with non-profit charter status with NGOs, and those with 
for-profit charters with banks and credit unions. Results are qualitatively similar to those presented below. 
When we dropped all NBFIs from the sample, we obtained somewhat similar results, though the loss of so 
many observations reduced significance levels.    15 
the sample and the results of the regressions are very similar when they are dropped.
10 As 
expected, non-NGO/NBFI status is strongly positively linked to our primary supervisory 
dummy variable, onsite supervision at regular intervals (correlation .40, p-value 0.000). 
Because charter status was determined at the outset of the creation of each MFI, prior to 
and without substantial consideration for whether the MFI would face supervision, non-
NGO/NBFI status can be viewed as exogenous. In some specifications, we interact non-
NGO/NBFI status with the Big Bank Supervision variable or the OS index.
11
As noted by CLR (2003), prudential supervision should generally be triggered 
when an MFI accepts retail deposits from the general public so as to safeguard the 
savings of relatively poor depositors. We therefore use a dummy variable indicating 
whether an MFI accepts retail deposits (savings dummy) as our second MFI-level 
instrument.
 The intuition 
behind the interaction is that supervision should be especially likely for non-NGO/NBFI 
MFIs located in countries where the general propensity to regulate and supervise 
providers of financial services is high. 
12 Like non-NGO/NBFI status, we presume that the decision to accept 
deposits was, in most instances, taken at the outset of the creation of the MFI. Also 
similar to non-NGO/NBFI status, we interact the savings dummy with the Big Banks 
Supervision variable and the OS index. MFIs that accept deposits and operate in countries 
with a high propensity to regulate should be among those most likely to face 
supervision.
13
Most of the control variables in the X matrix in equation (1) are the same as those 
used in other studies of MFI performance and outreach (Ahlin and Lin, 2006; Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 2007).  One new variable is Premium, the difference 
 
                                                 
10 Dropping credit unions and cooperatives from the regressions reduces the sample by only 8-13 
observations depending on the specification. Credit unions and cooperatives are mutuals with an objective 
to achieve operational sustainability (returning any surplus to members), rather than seeking profit in order 
to remunerate shareholders as in the case of private banks. Regression results for the sample that excludes 
the credit unions and cooperatives are available from the authors. 
11 The correlation between non-NGO/NBFI status*Big Bank Supervision and regular onsite supervision is 
0.51 (p-value 0.000). The correlation between non-NGO/NBFI status*OS index and regular onsite 
supervisions is .43 (p-value 0.000). 
12 The correlation between the savings dummy and regular onsite supervision is 0.49 (p-value 0.000). 
13  The correlation between Savings*Big Banks Supervision and regular onsite supervision is 0.44 (p-value 
0.000). The correlation between Savings*OS index and regular onsite supervision is 0.48 (p-value 0.000).   16 
between the interest rates an MFI charges its borrowers and the rate it pays on its own 
liabilities. The interest rate charged on loans equals total interest revenue divided by the 
gross loan portfolio. Because loan losses are not netted out of the interest revenues, this 
measure is intended to capture the ex-ante interest rate charged by the lender rather than 
the ex-post interest rate realized on the portfolio. Interest paid on liabilities equals total 
interest payments divided by commercial liabilities. All else equal, a higher premium is 
presumably associated with greater profitability. 
Equation 1 also includes labor costs and capital costs, both measured relative to 
total assets.
14
Country-level control variables include Inflation, real GDP Growth, and a 
measure of broad institutional development created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Maztruzzi 
(2007). We expect the KKM Institutional Development and GDP Growth variables to be 
 Both variables should be negatively associated with profitability. Solidarity 
is a dummy variable equal to one if an MFI makes joint liability loans to solidarity 
groups. Loans are made to individuals, but the group, which has between 3 and 10 
members depending on the institution and location, shoulders responsibility for a loan if a 
member cannot repay. Village Bank is a dummy variable equal to one if the MFI does 
village banking, where each branch forms a single, large group and is given a degree of 
self-governance (this kind of arrangement was pioneered by FINCA and is now 
employed by organizations like Pro Mujer and Freedom from Hunger). MFIs that make 
standard bilateral loans to individuals (so-called individual-based lenders) therefore form 
the omitted category in our regressions. 
Additional MFI-level controls include Age (measured in years since inception), 
Size (as measured by total assets), and Average Loan Size (relative to GNP per capita). 
We expect all three variables to be positively linked to MFI profitability – age and size 
because they reflect how well established the MFI is, and average loan size because 
making relatively large loans to fewer customers is likely to be more efficient than 
making large numbers of small loans (as discussed above). The size indicator is also 
included to control for economies of scale that larger MFIs might enjoy. 
                                                 
14 Capital costs are measured as: (rent + transportation + depreciation + office expenses +other 
expenses)/total assets. Labor costs are: personnel expenses/total assets.   17 
positively linked to MFI profitability, and Inflation to have a negative relationship. 
Finally, region is a matrix of dummy variables for each main region of the developing 
world, with “Latin America and the Caribbean” as the omitted category. 
IV.  Results: OLS vs. Treatment Effects Regressions 
Due to the non-random assignment of supervision to MFIs discussed in section 2, this 
section highlights the differences in results from estimation techniques that account for 
selection effects (treatment effects and IV regressions) with those from one that does not 
(OLS). We discuss regressions that explain profitability, outreach, and staffing in 
separate sub-sections. 
A.  Profitability 
The OLS regression in Table 3 (model 1) indicates that, as expected, there is a negative 
relationship between Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) and our supervisory variables.
15 
We use FSS instead of operational self-sufficiency (OSS), another commonly used 
measure of MFI performance, because FSS better incorporates making a return on capital 
that is market related and commensurate with the risks involved.
16
                                                 
15 We drop rural banks from the sample in all of the regressions that we present. The profile of the rural 
banks provides strong indications that they are not like other banks or credit unions. All face regular onsite 
supervision, yet 86% of their borrowers are women and their average loan size is 1.7 times the per capita 
GDP of the bottom quintile, which is similar to that for un-supervised MFIs (see Table 2). They are also 
larger (average size category 2.2) and older (36.3 years) than most MFIs in the sample, and all are located 
in a single country, the Philippines. Qualitative results are not however substantially different when we 
include rural banks in the sample. It is unfortunate that we do not have a wider sample of rural banks since 
these are precisely the prudentially supervised MFIs that are likely to be reaching the poorest clients. 
16 By contrast operational self-sufficiency is more concerned with covering costs and, perhaps, generating 
some surplus. 
 Thus, the additional 
costs of complying with prudential supervision are associated with reduced financial self-
sufficiency. Significance levels and the magnitudes of some coefficients are slightly 
higher for the regular onsite supervision dummy variable than for the simple onsite 
supervision variable, a pattern consistent with regular supervision being more stringent, 
and thus costlier. The associations are also economically large: MFIs facing regular 
onsite supervision have FSS levels .18 lower than other MFIs. The sample mean for FSS 
is 1.03. Because the qualitative results for the simple onsite dummy and the regular onsite   18 
dummy are so similar, we report results only for the regular onsite supervision variable in 
the tables to conserve space. 
When we control for the non-random assignment of prudential supervision via 
treatment effects and IV regression (models 2-4 in Table 3), there is no significant 
relationship between the supervision variables and FSS. This suggests that those MFIs 
that are both outreach-oriented and supervised cannot or do not adjust to the increase in 
costs imposed by supervision, and are driving the negative significant coefficient for 
supervision in the OLS regression. On the flip side, the treatment effects and IV 
regressions suggest that the profit-oriented MFIs that are likely to be selected for 
supervision find ways to maintain their profitability. Below we test whether those 
methods include making larger loans and lending less to women. Although our 




 we cannot reject the hypothesis that the errors for the selection equation are 
uncorrelated with those for the FSS regression based on the likelihood ratio test near the 
bottom of the treatment effects regressions. Both of the instruments used in   are 
excludable in that they are not significant when they replace the supervision variable in 
the simple OLS regression. 
Regarding the control variables in the FSS regressions, the interest premium is 
positive and highly significant across all specifications. Labor and capital costs are 
negative and significant across specifications. None of the additional MFI-level controls 
(age, size, average loan size) is significant. However, village banks tend to have higher 
FSS in some of the treatment effects and IV regressions.  
Inflation is negative and significant in most regressions, in line with findings from 
Ahlin and Lin (2006) that the macroeconomic context is a key determinant of MFI 
performance.
18
                                                 
17 Since all of the instruments are highly significant in the selection equation, we do not present them in the 
tables so as to conserve space. 
18 Coefficients for the macroeconomic controls and the regional dummies are also suppressed in the tables 
to make them more readable. The full specifications are available from the authors. 
 Like those authors, we also find that real growth is positive and more 
highly correlated with FSS than inflation. As hypothesized, the KKM measure of 
institutional development is positive and significant in three of the regressions.   19 
Qualitative results are similar for regressions in Table 4 where the dependent 
variable is return on assets (ROA).
19
In the OLS regression in 
 Again, the supervision variables are negative and 
significant in the OLS regression, but insignificant in the treatment effects and IV 
regressions. The results for the control variables are similar to those for the FSS 
regressions, although the inflation coefficient is no longer significant and the growth 
variable tends to be less significant. The ROA regressions indicate more strongly than the 
FSS regressions that profitability is lower for MFIs located in Sub-Saharan Africa, East 
Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa. The instruments are again excludable in that 
they are not significant when included in the simple OLS regressions. We again cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the errors for the selection equation are uncorrelated with those 
for the ROA regression based on the likelihood ratio test near the bottom of the treatment 
effects regressions.  
B.  Outreach 
In the previous sub-section we found no significant relationship between supervision and 
MFI profitability when we controlled for the non-random assignment of supervision via 
treatment effects or IV regressions. Here we test whether MFIs maintain profitability 
while absorbing the additional costs of supervision by curtailing outreach, specifically 
whether they make larger loans and fewer loans to women.  
Table 5, the supervisory variable is negatively associated 
with average loan size measured relative to the income of the bottom quintile in each 
country, though the result is not significant. As in the profitability regressions, results 
change when we account for the non-random assignment of supervision using treatment 
effects or IV regressions (models 2-4). Those regressions indicate a positive link between 
supervision and loan size (significant in models 2 and 3).
20
                                                 
19 Like the FSS variable, the income portion of the ROA variable is adjusted to reflect a variety of 
subsidies. Those subsidies are described in Appendix C. 
 The magnitude of the 
20 MFI performance measures are from 2003 or 2004, essentially a cross-section. The stringency of 
supervision and regulation data is based on information from the MIX website from 2007 (and other 
sources, when that one proved insufficient). We acknowledge that this could produce some weakness in the 
results (as in models 3 and 4 in Table 5), though we find it unlikely that a large share of the MFIs in the 
sample were changing their supervisory status during this period. In any event, we have no way to check. 
The Barth, Caprio, and Levine data (used for the big banks’ supervision variable and index of official   20 
supervisory coefficients is also quite large. Regular onsite supervision is associated with 
increases in loan sizes almost two times the average income of the lowest quintile in 
model 2. Coefficients are even larger in the IV regression (model 3).
21
Results for the control variables in 
 
Comparisons between the OLS and treatment effects regressions suggest that 
those MFIs that are both outreach-oriented and supervised are driving the negative, 
nearly significant coefficient between supervision and average loan size in the OLS 
regression.  Finally, our instruments are all highly significant in the selection equations 
and of the sign that we predicted, and we can reject the hypothesis that the errors for the 
selection equation are uncorrelated with those for the average loan size regression based 
on the likelihood ratio test near the bottom of the treatment effects regressions. Thus, 
some adjustment for the non-random assignment of supervision is necessary.  
Excludability of our instruments is, however, a somewhat thornier issue for the 
average loan size regressions than it was in the profitability regressions.  For example, the 
interaction between the savings dummy and big banks’ supervision is significant in the 
simple OLS regression at the p=.01 level, indicating that it is unsuitable for use as an 
instrument. The interaction between non-NGO/NBFI and big banks’ supervision is 
insignificant, but the p-value is a bit too close for comfort (.12). However, recognizing 
that excludability is a problem in the average loans size regressions, there are some in 
which the problem is less severe, and the results support the notion that profit-oriented 
MFIs that face onsite supervision extend substantially larger loans than those that do not 
face supervision. 
Table 5 are different than in the profitability 
regressions. The MFI size indicator, based on total assets, is strongly positively 
associated with larger loan size. Premium is negative and highly significant indicating 
that MFIs require a wider margin between lending and borrowing interest rates to make 
small loans. All else equal, village banks and, to a lesser extent, solidarity group lenders 
                                                                                                                                                 
supervisory powers) are also cross-sectional and more or less contemporaneous with the MFI performance 
data, so we are less concerned that there is a major problem, though we acknowledge that if the 
performance effects of supervision show up at a lag, results might be weak. 
21 Results are also similar when we replace average loan size relative to the income of the bottom quintile 
with average loan size relative to income per capita as the dependent variable in the regressions.   21 
tend to extend smaller loans. Regional dummies also play a more important role in the 
loan size regressions than in the profitability regressions. Negative significant 
coefficients for many regions indicate that loan sizes tend to be larger in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, the omitted region in the regressions. Coefficients for the other 
regions indicate that loan sizes are smallest in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South 
Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa.  
The results for the share of lending to women provide strong support for the 
notion that profit-oriented MFIs that face onsite supervision curtail outreach (Table 6). In 
the OLS regression, there is a negative relationship between onsite supervision and the 
share of lending to women. In the treatment effects and IV regressions, there is also a 
significant negative relationship between supervision and lending to women, but the 
coefficients are much larger (in absolute value) than in the OLS regression. Again, our 
instruments are significant in the selection equations and of the sign that we predicted. 
Moreover, none of our instruments are significant (at the p=.10 level) when they replace 
the supervision variable in the OLS regression, which indicates that they are excludable, 
though the p-value is .11 for one of them. For model 2, which uses big banks’ supervision 
x non-NGO/NBFI  as an instrument, we can also reject (at the p=.05 level) the hypothesis 
that the errors from the selection equation are uncorrelated with those from the share of 
lending to women regression based on the likelihood ratio test near the bottom of the 
treatment effects regressions. 
The relative importance of the control variables is different in the women’s lending share 
regressions than in the average loan size regressions. MFI size is not significantly 
associated with the share of lending to women. However, lending method is important; 
solidarity group lenders and village banks devote 7-20 percentage points more of their 
loans to women than do individual-based lenders based on the coefficients in Table 6. 
The premium variable is also highly significant indicating that the interest rates charged 
on loans to women are relatively high. Finally, the share of lending to women tends to be 
higher for MFIs in South Asia than those in other regions. In all, the results for both 
average loan size and the share of lending to women indicate that, once we control for its   22 
non-random assignment, prudential supervision is associated with less outreach. C.
  Staffing 
As noted in the introduction, the administrative work associated with preparing regular 
reports for supervisors is likely to be done in headquarters resulting in less staff working 
directly with clients in the field. To test that proposition, we use the percentage of staff 
located in headquarters as a dependent variable in the regressions in Table 7. We find that 
regular onsite supervision is positively associated with the share of staff located in 
headquarters. In the treatment effects and IV regressions, that relationship is even 
stronger.   
Though the results point in the predicted direction, we must acknowledge that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the errors from the selection equation and the % 
headquarters staff equation are independent based on the likelihood ratio for the treatment 
effects regressions, and big banks’ supervision x non-NGO/NBFI is significant in the 
OLS regression, indicating that it is an unsuitable instrument. However, the regressions 
provide some evidence consistent with the idea that supervised firms re-deploy personnel 
away from the field to comply with regulation. This re-deployment could also contribute 
to reduced outreach. 
As a final exercise, we used the share of the loan portfolio that was delinquent at 
least thirty days as a dependent variable. Though our results to this point are consistent 
with the idea that prudential supervision imposes costs on MFIs, it might also be true that 
it helps ensure the safety of deposits, which could be an important goal given that MFIs 
tend to have small depositors as customers. In OLS regressions, the relationship between 
regular onsite supervision and delinquent portfolio share is positive and significant, 
indicating perhaps that supervised MFIs tend to take on more credit risk than others. In 
the treatment effects and IV regressions, the delinquent portfolio share variable is no 
longer significant, suggesting that prudential supervision can contribute to improved 
portfolio quality. However, data from only 37 MFIs enters those regressions, which pass 
neither the simple excludability test nor the likelihood ratio test indicating that the errors 
from the selection equation and the equation of interest are independent. We do not,   23 
therefore, present those results in the tables and are reluctant to draw conclusions about 
the stability benefits of the prudential supervision, which is a topic better left to future 
research. 
V.  Split-Sample Robustness Checks 
The ideal empirical test would involve otherwise identical MFIs; some subjected to 
prudential supervision, others not. In practice, such an experiment is not possible, and 
thus the treatment effects regressions are designed to approximate it. The differences 
between the OLS and treatment effects regressions in the previous section provide an 
indication that supervision has a causal effect on the trade-off between profitability and 
outreach. For a number of those regressions our instruments also satisfy standard 
statistical tests of excludability. Still, one cannot help but worry that the treatment effects 
and IV regressions are picking up a distinction between types of MFIs. Those with a 
relatively high-profitability, low-outreach profile might also tend to supervised. 
Supervision might just be a part of, rather than a cause of, the profile.  
To address that concern, this section offers tests that split our sample so that we 
can compare the supervised and unsupervised within a group of MFIs that are similar on 
non-supervisory dimensions. We use the “non-commercial funding ratio” to split our 
sample.  That ratio is zero if all funds come from either commercial borrowing or 
deposit-taking.  The ratio is 1 if the institution draws funds from neither source, instead 
relying on donations, borrowing at below-market interest rates (i.e., subsidized loans) or 
equity.
22
                                                 
22 The “non-commercial funding ratio” is defined as (donations + non-commercial borrowing + equity) 
divided by total funds.  Here, donations are defined as: donated equity from prior years + donations to 
subsidize financial services + an in-kind subsidy adjustment.  Equity is the sum of  paid-in capital, reserves, 
and other equity accounts; it does not include retained earnings or net income.  Commercial borrowing 
refers to borrowing at commercial interest rates (though in practice it can be hard to determine where the 
market would set those rates).  Non-commercial borrowing, in parallel, is borrowing at concessional 
interest rates (with the same caveat as above).  Total funds are the sum of donations, equity, deposits (both 
savings and time deposits), commercial borrowing, and non-commercial borrowing. 
 In a companion paper, we find that MFIs with similar non-commercial funding 
ratios also tend to have similar profitability and outreach profiles (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Morduch, 2009). We conjecture that higher shares of non-commercial funding 
coincide with softer budget constraints, and greater pursuit of outreach at the expense of   24 
profitability. By grouping MFIs with similar funding profiles, therefore, we are 
comparing the effects of prudential supervision for MFIs with similar objectives and 
incentives. 
Table 8, Panel A offers summary statistics for our dependent variables for 
commercial organizations, MFIs with non-commercial funding ratios less than 50%. If 
our story is correct, we would expect supervised firms in this group to maintain 
profitability while absorbing the costs of supervision by curtailing outreach. Table 8 
shows no significant difference in the average profitability (FSS or Adjusted ROA) of 
commercial MFIs that face onsite supervision and those that do not.
23
By contrast, within the group of non-commercially oriented MFIs (those with 
non-commercial funding ratios greater than or equal to %50), we would expect that 
absorbing the costs of supervision would be less likely to result in reduced outreach. And 
in fact, Table 8, Panel B shows no significant difference in average loan size, share of 
women borrowers, or share of staff in headquarters for supervised and un-supervised 
non-commercial MFIs. We would, however, expect the costs of supervision to be 
reflected in reduced profitability. Supervised non-commercial MFIs do in fact have lower 
average FSS than the unsupervised (0.86 versus 1.00), though the difference is not quite 
significant at conventional levels. The simple correlation between supervision and FSS 
for non-commercial MFIs is -0.19 (p=.07) for the regular onsite supervision variable and 
-0.14 (p=.19) for onsite supervision. There are not, however, any significant relationships 
 By contrast, the 
average outreach of commercial MFIs that face onsite supervision is significantly less 
than that of those that do not. The difference is also reflected in simple correlation 
coefficients between onsite supervision and outreach measures: 0.23 (p=.014) for average 
loan size; -0.38 (p=.0003) for share of women borrowers; and 0.44 (p=.0003) for the 
share of staff located in headquarters.  Within a group of relatively homogeneous MFIs 
that have strong incentives to be profitable, we therefore find evidence consistent with the 
notion that supervised MFIs maintain a profitability level similar to unsupervised ones by 
curtailing outreach. 
                                                 
23 As in Table 2, we use the onsite supervision variable in Table 8 because it provides a more balanced split 
of the sample.   25 
between the supervisory variables and adjusted ROA for this group of MFIs. Despite a 
somewhat weak relationship between supervision and profitability, the results in Panel B 
are broadly consistent with our story: supervised non-commercial MFIs do not tend to 
have poorer outreach than unsupervised ones, and there is some evidence that they are 
less profitable. 
Grouping MFIs by the non-commercial funding ratio is a reasonable, albeit rough 
method for examining the effects of supervision within a relatively homogeneous pool. 
However, within the group of commercial (or non-commercial) MFIs, supervised 
institutions might have systematically different characteristics (size, age, lending 
methodology) than the unsupervised, which could be driving the differences in means 
that we found in Table 8. We therefore regress each of our dependent variables on the 
supervision variable and all of the other control variables from the base regressions 
(Tables 3-7). To be consistent with the base regressions, we use the regular onsite 
supervision variable in Table 9, though results are qualitatively similar for the onsite 
supervision variable.  
For non-commercial MFIs (bottom row of coefficients) regular onsite supervision 
is not significant in the average loan size, women borrowers, or headquarters staff 
specifications. Supervision is, however, strongly negatively linked to FSS and adjusted 
ROA, much more so than in the simple bi-variate calculations. For commercial MFIs, 
supervision is significant and negative in the women borrowers’ regression, and 
significant and positive in the percentage of staff in headquarters regression, results 
which reinforce the relationships suggested by Table 8. The supervision variable is not, 
however, significant in the average loan size regression. Supervision is insignificant for 
commercial MFIs in the FSS regression, also consistent with the bi-variate calculations. 
Supervision is negative and significant in the ROA regression for commercial MFIs, but 
much smaller (in absolute value) than for non-commercial MFIs. This indicates that 
supervised commercial MFIs are more successful in maintaining their ROA than 
supervised non-commercial MFIs, which is also consistent with our story.  By and large, 
the results from the split-sample tests confirm those from our base regressions.   26 
IV.  Conclusions 
To date, there has been relatively little discussion, at least within academic circles, and 
almost no empirical analysis of the effects that prudential supervision is likely to have on 
MFI profitability and outreach. To address these issues, we combine high-quality balance 
sheet and income statement data for 245 leading MFIs with a newly constructed database 
of the type of supervision that each faces.   
Strong patterns emerge from the supervisory data indicating that its assignment is 
non-random. Specifically, supervision tends to be more stringent for commercially-
oriented MFIs, non-NGOs that collect deposits from the public, lend to individuals 
(rather than groups), make larger loans, have proportionately fewer female customers, 
and have a higher share of staff concentrated in the head office (and thus fewer staff with 
contact with clients in the field).  
Searching for appropriate instrumental variables is of course difficult because 
many of the characteristics that define supervised MFIs are likely to be endogenous in 
profitability and outreach regressions. We therefore offer three instruments for use in 
treatment effects and IV regressions that have bearing on whether an MFI is regulated but 
do not directly affect MFI performance. The first is the general propensity to supervise 
formal financial institutions in a country as reflected in a dummy variable indicating 
whether large banks face onsite supervision at regular intervals. The second is a dummy 
indicating that an MFI was not chartered as an NGO or NBFI, since charter status was 
determined at the outset of the creation of each MFI, prior to and without substantial 
consideration for whether the MFI would face supervision. Similarly, our third 
instrument is a dummy indicating whether an MFI takes deposits, because that decision 
was also presumably taken at the inception of the MFI in most cases.  
The selection stage of our treatment effects regressions confirms that non-
NGO/NBFI’s that take deposits and are located in countries that supervise large banks at 
regular intervals are most likely to face onsite supervision at regular intervals. 
Controlling for the non-random assignment via those instruments, we find that regular 
onsite supervision is positively associated with average loan size and negatively   27 
associated with the share of lending to women. Though onsite supervision is negatively 
associated with profitability in OLS regressions, we find no significant relationship 
between supervision and profitability in treatment effects or IV regressions. The pattern 
of results is consistent with the idea that profit-oriented MFIs that have to comply with 
prudential supervision respond by curtailing their outreach to segments of the population 
that are more costly to serve.
24
 
 By contrast, MFIs that rely on non-commercial sources of 
funding (e.g., donations), and thus are less profit-oriented, do not adjust loan sizes or lend 
less to women when supervised, but their profitability is significantly reduced. Split 
sample tests based on the share of funding that an MFI receives from non-commercial 
sources confirm this pattern. Though these results are intuitive from an economic 
perspective, it remains an open question whether the benefits of supervision in terms of 
better protection of depositors’ funds and improved stability in the MFI sector outweigh 
the reductions in outreach.  
 
                                                 
24 Again, we note that these results do not pertain to rural banks since our sample included so few of them 
and all were from the same country. This is unfortunate since these are precisely the prudentially 
supervised MFIs that are likely to be reaching the poorest clients. This is clearly a promising area for 
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Table 3: The Effect of Regulatory Supervision on MFI Financial Self-Sustainability (FSS) 





Effects  IV 
Treatment 
Effects 
Regular Onsite Supervision  -0.176***  -0.045  0.078  0.007 
   (3.60)  (0.53)  (0.70)  (0.06) 
Premium  0.808***  0.733***  0.738***  0.745*** 
   (3.83)  (3.54)  (3.63)  (3.59) 
Capital Costs to Assets  -1.477***  -1.315***  -1.158**  -1.330*** 
   (3.56)  (2.66)  (2.50)  (2.68) 
Labor Costs to Assets  -1.684***  -1.754***  -1.525***  -1.740 
   (4.91)  (4.12)  (4.23)  (4.08) 
Village Bank  0.055  0.102*  0.152***  0.104* 
   (1.12)  (1.80)  (2.69)  (1.82) 
Solidarity  -0.055  -0.031  -0.006  -0.030 
   (1.34)  (0.466)  (0.15)  (0.70) 
Average Loan Size  0.003  0.001  0.009  0.001 
  (0.40)  (0.14)  (1.19)  (0.13) 
Size Indicator  0.004  -0.0001  -0.019  -0.008 
   (0.13)  (0.04)  (0.65)  (0.23) 
Log of Age  0.029  0.047  0.048  0.041 
   (0.75)  (1.38)  (1.37)  (1.19) 
Observations   167  154  154  154 
R-squared  0.3799       
Prob>chi    0.0000    0.0000 
Prob>F  0.000    0.0000   
         
LR test of independent 
equations: Prob>chi    0.2607    0.2527 
 
Anderson LR statistic 
(identification/IV 
relevance): Chi-sq P-val       0.0000   












Dummy x Big 
Banks 
Supervision 
         
Significant in OLS?    P = 0.743  P = 0.743  P = 0.311 
    Notes: The regressions also include inflation, real GDP growth, the KKM measure of institutional development,  
regional dummy variables, and a constant. Observations where premium, FSS, or average loan size (relative to the  
bottom quintile) ranked above the 99
th or below the 1
st percentile are dropped from the regressions. Rural banks are  
also excluded from the sample. The excludability test is based on an OLS regression in which the instrument replaces the regular 
onsite supervision variable. The hope is that the coefficient on the instrument is insignificant, and thus it can be viewed as excludable. 
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Table 4: The Effect of Regulatory Supervision on MFI  Adjusted Return On Assets 





Effects  IV 
Treatment 
Effects 
Regular Onsite Supervision  -0.058***  -0.026  0.005  0.0007 
   (5.07)  (1.14)  (0.19)  (0.02) 
Premium  0.337***  0.347***  0.348***  0.353*** 
   (4.96)  (6.56)  (4.85)  (6.54) 
Capital Costs to Assets  -0.433***  -0.452***  -0.411***  -0.463*** 
   (3.25)  (3.57)  (2.58)  (3.59) 
Labor Costs to Assets  -0.761***  -0.818***  -0.756***  -0.820*** 
   (4.71)  (7.52)  (4.83)  (7.43) 
Village Bank  0.006  0.016  0.029  0.017 
   (0.38)  (1.12)  (1.38)  (1.18) 
Solidarity  0.007  0.010  0.017  0.011 
   (0.55)  (0.98)  (1.16)  (1.02) 
Average Loan size  0.001  0.0003  0.002  0.00004 
  (0.37)  (0.13)  (1.35)  (0.02) 
Size Indicator  0.001  -0.002  -0.007  -0.005 
   (1.42)  (0.27)  (0.91)  (0.52) 
Log of Age  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003 
   (0.47)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.42) 
Observations   167  154  154  154 
R-squared  0.5069    0.4879   
Prob>chi    0.0000    0.0000 
Prob>F  0.0000    0.0000   
         
LR test of independent 
equations: Prob>chi    0.2634    0.2050 
 
Anderson LR statistic 
(identification/IV 
relevance): Chi-sq P-val       0.0000   












Dummy x Big 
Banks 
Supervision 
         
Significant in OLS?    P = 0.417  P = 0.417  P = 0.538 
    Notes: The regressions also include inflation, real GDP growth, the KKM measure of institutional development,  
regional dummy variables, and a constant. Observations where premium, adjusted ROA, or average loan size (relative to  
the bottom quintile) ranked above the 99
th or below the 1
st percentile are dropped from the regressions. Rural banks are  
also excluded from the sample. The excludability test is based on an OLS regression in which the instrument replaces the regular 
onsite supervision variable. The hope is that the coefficient on the instrument is insignificant, and thus it can be viewed as excludable. 
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            Table 5: The Effect of Regulatory Supervision on MFI Average Loan Size (Relative to Income of Bottom Quintile) 
 
Dependent Variable: Average Loan Size/Income Per 





Effects  IV 
Treatment 
Effects 
Regular Onsite Supervision  -1.072  1.751***  4.293*  0.952 
   (1.55)  (2.85)  (1.73)  (1.02) 
Premium  -7.191***  -7.498***  -8.681***  -7.007*** 
   (3.91)  (4.63)  (3.42)  (3.72) 
Capital Costs to Assets  -2.827  -0.032  2.469  -1.792 
   (0.94)  (0.01)  (0.51)  (0.38) 
Labor Costs to Assets  1.247  2.792  8.956*  2.066 
   (0.41)  (0.78)  (1.77)  (0.51) 
Village Bank  -1.215***  -1.058**  -0.156  -1.303** 
   (3.76)  (2.14)  (0.22)  (2.41) 
Solidarity  -0.625  -0.549  0.163  -0.445 
   (1.53)  (1.45)  (0.27)  (1.09) 
Size Indicator  1.251***  1.041***  1.080**  1.198*** 
   (3.41)  (3.21)  (2.13)  (3.50) 
Log of Age  -0.181  0.163  0.013  -0.112 
   (0.69)  (0.52)  (0.04)  (0.34) 
Observations   167  154  154  154 
R-squared  0.3811    0.3586   
Prob>chi    0.0000    0.0000 
Prob>F  0.0000    0.0000   
         
LR test of independent 
equations: Prob>chi    0.0000    0.004 
 
Anderson LR statistic 
(identification/IV 
relevance): Chi-sq P-val       0.0000   












Dummy x Big 
Banks 
Supervision 
         
Significant in OLS?    P= 0.121  P = 0.121  P= 0.001 
    Notes: The regressions also include inflation, real GDP growth, the KKM measure of institutional development,  
regional dummy variables, and a constant. Observations where premium, FSS, or average loan size (relative to the  
bottom quintile) ranked above the 99
th or below the 1
st percentile are dropped from the regressions. Rural banks are  
also excluded from the sample. The excludability test is based on an OLS regression in which the instrument replaces the regular 
onsite supervision variable. The hope is that the coefficient on the instrument is insignificant, and thus it can be viewed as excludable. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Regulatory Supervision on Fraction of Borrowers That Are Women 





Effects  IV 
Treatment 
Effects 
Regular Onsite Supervision  -0.172***  -0.320***  -0.366***  -0.350*** 
   (3.01)  (3.56)  (2.56)  (2.22) 
Premium  0.507***  0.530***  0.557***  0.525*** 
   (2.77)  (2.90)  (2.66)  (2.80) 
Capital Costs to Assets  0.072  0.015  -0.102  0.035 
   (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.07) 
Labor Costs to Assets  -0.272  -0.1038  -0.495  -0.154 
   (0.62)  (0.24)  (1.06)  (0.35) 
Village Bank  0.159***  0.189***  0.177***  0.195*** 
   (2.89)  (3.79)  (3.16)  (3.75) 
Solidarity  0.070*  0.085**  0.071  0.087** 
   (1.72)  (2.10)  (1.60)  (2.14) 
Size Indicator  -0.017  -0.0005  -0.004  -0.003 
   (0.54)  (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.10) 
Log of Age  0.003  0.009  0.001  0.009 
   (0.08)  (0.28)  (0.04)  (0.26) 
Observations   134  121  121  121 
R-squared  0.4265    0.3795   
Prob>chi    0.0000     
Prob>F  0.0000    0.0000   
         
LR test of independent 
equations: Prob>chi    0.0438    0.6157 
 
Anderson LR statistic 
(identification/IV 
relevance): Chi-sq P-val       0.0000   












Dummy x Big 
Banks 
Supervision 
         
Significant in OLS?    P = 0.111  P = 0.111  P = 0.306 
    Notes: The regressions also include inflation, real GDP growth, the KKM measure of institutional development,  
regional dummy variables, and a constant. Observations where premium, FSS, or average loan size (relative to the  
bottom quintile) ranked above the 99
th or below the 1
st percentile are dropped from the regressions. Rural banks are  
also excluded from the sample. The excludability test is based on an OLS regression in which the instrument replaces the regular 
onsite supervision variable. The hope is that the coefficient on the instrument is insignificant, and thus it can be viewed as excludable. 
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Table 7: The Effect of Regulatory Supervision on MFI Staff Concentration 





Effects  IV 
Treatment 
Effects 
Regular Onsite Supervision  0.158*  0.321***  0.321**  0.388*** 
   (1.85)  (2.81)  (2.25)  (2.82) 
Premium  -0.629*  -0.306  -0.315  -0.320 
   (1.87)  (1.09)  (1.30)  (1.15) 
Capital Costs to Assets  1.041  0.613  0.620  0.572 
   (1.39)  (0.97)  (1.14)  (0.90) 
Labor Costs to Assets  -0.826  -0.181**  -1.136***  -1.146** 
   (1.16)  (2.08)  (3.49)  (2.02) 
Village Bank  -0.070  -0.005  -0.004  -0.005 
   (0.96)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
Solidarity  -0.118*  -0.036  -0.037  -0.035 
   (1.86)  (0.68)  (0.77)  (0.69) 
Size Indicator  -0.159***  -0.173***  -0.175***  -0.174*** 
   (2.71)  (3.71)  (3.49)  (3.77) 
Log of Age  -0.513  -0.033  -0.031  -0.040 
   (1.15)  (0.85)  (1.01)  (1.00) 
Observations   101  92  92  92 
R-squared  0.5210    0.7306   
Prob>chi    0.0000    0.0000 
Prob>F  0.0000    0.0000   
         
LR test of independent 
equations: Prob>chi    0.7263    0.375 
 
Anderson LR statistic 
(identification/IV 
relevance): Chi-sq P-val       0.0000   












Dummy x Big 
Banks 
Supervision 
         
Significant in OLS?    P = 0.028  P = 0.028  P = 0.182 
    Notes: The regressions also include inflation, real GDP growth, the KKM measure of institutional development,  
regional dummy variables, and a constant. Observations where premium, FSS, or average loan size (relative to the  
bottom quintile) ranked above the 99
th or below the 1
st percentile are dropped from the regressions. Rural banks are also  
excluded from the sample. The excludability test is based on an OLS regression in which the instrument replaces the regular onsite 
supervision variable. The hope is that the coefficient on the instrument is insignificant, and thus it can be viewed as excludable. 
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Table 8 
Panel A: Sample Comparison of Commercial Organizations*, Supervised Versus Unsupervised MFIs 
Variable  Faces Onsite 
Supervision 




 (t test  
significance 
at 95 CI)  
















Average Loan Size (Relative to 


























      Panel B: Sample Comparison of Non-Commercial Organizations*, Supervised Versus 
Unsupervised MFIs 
Variable  Faces Onsite 
Supervision 




 (t test  
significance 
at 95 CI)  
















Average Loan Size (Relative to 

























* All MFI’s that have a Non-Commercial Funding Ratio of 50% or greater are classified as Non-Commercial Organizations. The 
others are classified as Commercial Organizations. Standard deviations are in parentheses.   8 
 


























Funding Ratio< .5 
         




-0.096  -0.046***  -1.852  -0.190***  0.225** 
[0.06]  [0.01]  [1.20]  [0.06]  [0.10] 
 
Observations  93  93  95  68  50 






         
         
Regular Onsite 
Supervision  -0.527***  -0.157*** 
 
-0.226  -0.123  0.031 
[0.12]  [0.03]  [0.62]  [0.11]  [0.13] 
 
Observations  68  68  71  63  51 
R-squared  0.71  0.76  0.45  0.50  0.43 
    Notes: The regressions also include interest rate premium, capital and labor costs (relative to assets), MFI size and  
age, dummy variables for village bank and solidarity group lender, inflation, real GDP growth, the KKM measure of 
institutional development, regional dummy variables, and a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. Observations  
where premium, FSS, or average loan size (relative to the bottom quintile) ranked above the 99
th or below the 1
st percentile  
are dropped from the regressions. Rural banks are also excluded from the sample.    9 
  Appendix A. Variable Description and Summary Statistics            
  Variable Name   Definition  Mean  Median   Minimum  Maximum   
                     
 
Financial Self-Sufficiency  Adjusted operating revenue / Adjusted 
(financial expense + loan loss provision expense 
+ operating expense) 
1.030    1.035  -0.595  2.622 
 
 
Return on Assets adjusted  Adjusted net operating income after taxes / 
Average total assets 
-0.018  0.008  -1.658  0.413 
 
 
Average Loan Size to GNP 
per capita of the poorest 20% 
  2.160  1.269  .00002  37.777 
 
  Women Borrowers (%)  Percentage of borrowers who are women.  0.690  0.718  0.001  1.0   
 
Staff Concentration at Home 
Office 
Fraction of total staff based at the home office.  0.285  0.211  0.001  0.983 
 
 
Loan Officers (%)  Fraction of total staff that have direct contact 
with the clients. 
0.547  0.545  0.062  1.0 
 
 
Real Gross Portfolio Yield   (Yield on gross portfolio (nominal) - Inflation 
rate) / (1+ Inflation rate) 
0.222  0.201  -0.133  0.949 
 
 
Premium  Real Yield -  Real Interest Change Charged to 
Prime Lenders 
0.170  0.147  -0.212  0.803 
 
 
Annual Big Bank Onsite 
Supervision 
Dummy = 1 if “How frequently are onsite 
inspections conducted in large and medium size 
banks?” is annual or more frequent. 
0.755  1  0  1 
 
 
Non- (NBFI/NGO)  Dummy for Organizations that are not 
Classified as NGO’s or NBFI’s 
0.257    0  0  1 
 
 
Savings Dummy  Equal to 1 if the MFI accepts Voluntary 
Deposits 
0.421  0  0  1 
 
  Age  Age of the MFI in years  10.485  8  0  48   
 
Size of MFI Indicator  Size of the loan portfolio, which is 1 for small, 2 
for medium and 3 for large. 
2.491  3  1  3 
 
 
Village Bank Lender  The MFI does village bank style lending (as 
opposed to MFI who do individual lending or 
solidarity lending). 
0 .161  0  0  1 
 
 
Solidarity Lender  The MFI does some solidarity style lending (as 
opposed to MFI who do only individual lending 
or do village bank lending. 
0.572  1  0  1 
 
 
Capital Costs to Assets  (Rent + transportion + depreciation + office + 
other) / total assets  
0.0822  0.064  0.004  0.392 
 
  Labor Costs to Assets  Personnel expenses/total assets  0.101  0.078  0.005  0.461   
  KKM  Governance Index (Kaufman et al)  -0.489  -0.450  -1.587  1.245   
   Real GDPgr (%)    5.863  5.611  -3.094  17.854   
  Inflation    8.734  6.223  -4.567  51.461   
 
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 
  0.187  0  0  1 
 
  Africa     0.213  0  0  1   
  Middle East and North Africa     0.057  0  0  1   
  South Asia      0.075  0  0  1   
  East Asia and the Pacific     0.161  0  0  1     10 
Appendix B: Index of Official Supervisory Powers 
The questions that are used to calculate the index of official supervisory powers are:  
1.  Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to 
discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 
2.  Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency 
any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud 
or insider abuse? 
3.  Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 
4.  Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational 
structure? 
5.  Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 
6.  Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 
7.  Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute 
dividends? 
8.  Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute bonuses? 
9.  Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute 
management fees? 
10.  Who can legally declare –  such that this declaration supersedes the rights of 
shareholders  –  that a bank is insolvent? A) Bank supervisor; B) Court; C) Deposit 
insurance agency; D) Bank restructuring or asset management agency; E) Other. 
11.  According to the Banking Law, who has authority to intervene – that is, suspend 
some or all ownership rights –  a problem bank? A) Bank supervisor; B) Court; C) 
Deposit insurance agency; D) Bank restructuring or asset management agency; E) Other. 
12.  Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or 
any other government agency supersede shareholder rights or remove and replace 
management or directors? A) Bank supervisor; B) Court; C) Deposit insurance agency; 
D) Bank restructuring or asset management agency; E) Other. 
 
For questions 1-9: Yes=1: No=0. 
For questions 10-12: Bank supervisor=1: Deposit insurance agency=0.5; Bank 
restructuring or asset management agency=0; 0 otherwise. 
The official supervisory powers index is constructed as the sum of these assigned values, 
with higher values indicating greater power. 
Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006).   11 
Appendix C. Financial Statement Adjustments and their Effects 
Adjustment  Effect on Financial Statements   Type of Institution Most Affected by 
Adjustment 
Inflation Adjustment 
of Equity (minus Net 
Fixed Assets) 
Increases financial expense accounts on 
income statement, to some degree offset 
by inflation income account for 
revaluation of fixed assets.  Generates a 
reserve in the balance sheet’s equity 
account, reflecting that portion of the 
MFI’s retained earnings that has been 
consumed by the effects of inflation. 
Decreases profitability and “real” retained 
earnings. 
MFIs funded more by equity than by 
liabilities will be hardest hit, 








Decreases concessionary loan account and 
increases equity account; increases 
inflation adjustment on income statement 
and balance sheet. 
NGOs that have long-term low-
interest “loans” from international 
agencies that function more as 
donations than loans. 
Subsidized cost of 
funds adjustment. 
Increases financial expense on income 
statement to the extent that the MFI’s 
liabilities carry a below-market rate of 
interest. Decreases net income and 
increases subsidy adjustment account on 
balance sheet. 
MFIs with heavily subsidized loans 
(i.e., large lines of credit from 
governments or international 
agencies at highly subsidized rates). 
Subsidy adjustment: 
current-year cash 
donations to cover 
operating expenses 
 
Reduces operating expense on income 
statement (if the MFI records donations as 
operating income). Increases subsidy 
adjustment account on balance sheet. 
NGOs during their start-up phase. 
The adjustment is relatively less 
important for mature institutions. 
In-kind subsidy 
adjustment (e.g. 
donation of goods or 
services: line staff 
paid for by technical 
assistance providers) 
 
Increases operating expense on income 
statement to the extent that the MFI is 
receiving subsidized or donated goods or 
services. Decreases net income, increases 
subsidy adjustment on balance sheet. 
MFIs using goods or services for 
which they are not paying a market-
based cost (i.e., MFIs during their 
start-up phase). 




Usually increases loan loss provision 
expense on income statement and loan 
loss reserve on balance sheet. 
MFIs that have unrealistic loan loss 
provisioning policies. 
Write-off adjustment  On balance sheet, reduces gross loan 
portfolio and loan loss reserve by an equal 
amount, so that neither the net loan 
portfolio nor the income statement is 
affected. Improves (lowers) portfolio-at –
risk ratio. 
MFIs that do not write off non-
performing loans aggressively 
enough. 
Reversal of interest 
income accrued on 
non-performing loans 
Reduces financial income and net profit 
on the income statement, and equity on 
the balance sheet. 
MFIs that continue accruing income 
on delinquent loans past the point 
where collection becomes unlikely, 
or that fail to reverse previously 
accrued income on such loans. 
Source: The Microbanking Bulletin, Our Methodology 
(www.mixmbb.org/en/company/our_methodology.html) 
  